A New Weight on the Scale: Strengthening International Human Rights Law By Relying on Treaties in US Asylum Cases by Hugi, Allison
Masthead Logo Santa Clara Journal of International Law
Volume 17 | Issue 2 Article 3
4-29-2019
A New Weight on the Scale: Strengthening
International Human Rights Law By Relying on
Treaties in US Asylum Cases
Allison Hugi
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/scujil
Part of the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Santa
Clara Journal of International Law by an authorized editor of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com, pamjadi@scu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Allison Hugi, A New Weight on the Scale: Strengthening International Human Rights Law By Relying on Treaties in US Asylum Cases, 17
Santa Clara J. Int'l L. 1 (2019).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/scujil/vol17/iss2/3
  
 
 
  Volume 17 | Issue 1          Article 1 
           
 
 
 
A New Weight on the Scale: 
Strengthening International Human Rights 
Law By Relying on Treaties in US Asylum 
Cases 
By Allison Hugi 
2019                Santa Clara Journal of International Law 7:2 
 
 
 
Santa Clara Law 
Journal of International Law 
 
 
2019                  Volume 17 Issue II 
 
 
A New Weight on the Scale: 
Strengthening International Human 
Rights Law By Relying on Treaties in 
US Asylum Cases 
By Allison Hugi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
2019              A New Weight on the Scale 7:2 
 
ii 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This Article examines the role that domestic asylum cases in the United States can 
play in improving countries’ compliance with international human rights law. 
Using Australia, Canada, and the UK as case studies, it advocates for the domestic 
asylum process in the US to consider the status of international human rights 
treaties in the home countries of asylum seekers when making asylum decisions. 
The proposal takes advantage of proven informal enforcement mechanisms for 
international law, such as norm internalization and collateral consequences of 
violations; the natural connection between asylum law and international human 
rights law also means it ought to be less controversial within the US than other 
attempts to incorporate international law into the domestic legal system would be. 
The proposal offers a chance to make the abuse of human rights less attractive to 
countries while improving the robustness of asylum proceedings.  
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Introduction 
It is not hard to find arguments that international law is not worth the paper 
on which it is printed. A quick Google search offers law review articles inquiring, 
Does International Law Matter?; 1  newspaper articles asking the same; 2  and 
anxious prospective law students brainstorming on the subject.3 The argument goes 
that the international legal arena has no central enforcer, no credible sanctions, no 
oversight, no meaningful response to invocations of sovereignty, and rampant 
violations.  
International human rights law seems weak even within the field of 
international law, a catchall term including everything from cross-border 
transactional law to the law of war.4 Many other areas of international law at least 
have the threat of reciprocity to compel compliance. If Greece breaches a trade 
treaty with Croatia, Croatia can respond in kind. If Greece instead breaches a human 
rights treaty and tortures its citizens, Croatia cannot effectively reciprocate. 
Torturing its citizens would hardly cause Greece to internalize the costs of its 
original breach. In a world where most countries have adopted numerous 
international human rights treaties, it is impossible to avoid questions such as, 
“Why has the number of authoritarian countries increased in the last several years? 
Why do women remain a subordinate class in nearly all countries of the world? 
Why do children continue to work in mines and factories in so many countries?”5  
If there were an easy solution to this paradox—international human rights 
are at once lauded as “universal” and widely, egregiously violated—an enterprising 
academic presumably would have discovered it. Instead, we must take incremental 
steps. Human rights abusers see violating human rights as a means to maintaining 
power and stability. The goal, therefore, is to gradually tip the scale towards making 
the costs of violating human rights outweigh the benefits thereof. 
This Article proposes placing a novel “weight” on this scale, another force 
to drive up the costs of abusing human rights. Its proposal is that the US should 
adapt its domestic asylum process so that all parties must rely on international 
                                                 
1 Shima Baradaran, et al, Comment, Does International Law Matter?, 97 U. MINN. L. REV 743 
(2013).  
2 Christopher Shea, Does International Law Matter?, WALL ST. J., (May 13, 2011, 1:11 PM ), 
https://blogs.wsj.com/ideas-market/2011/05/13/does-international-law-matter/. 
3 So does international law really not exist?, TOP LAW SCHOOLS: FORUMS (Apr. 21, 2015, 12:27 
PM),  
http://www.top-law-schools.com/forums/viewtopic.php?t=246812. 
4 Because this Article focuses exclusively on the international human rights subset of 
international law, the term “international law” is hereafter used interchangeably with 
“international human rights law.”  
5 Eric Posner, The Case Against Human Rights, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 4, 2014, 10:00 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2014/dec/04/-sp-case-against-human-rights.  
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human rights law. Specifically, the Article proposes that asylum seekers 
(“applicants”) use as evidence their home countries’ failure to ratify international 
human rights treaties; the countries’ decisions to make relevant reservations to 
treaties; and the countries’ violations of treaties to prove persecution. Similarly, 
where a country has ratified, adopted optional protocols to, and complied with a 
treaty, the US government should argue those facts weaken an applicant’s claim for 
asylum. Asylum officers and judges should then weigh this evidence when making 
judgments. The use of treaties in asylum cases in this way may not revolutionize 
the status of international human rights law. This move will, however, create a new 
enforcement mechanism for international law that will encourage countries to sign 
on to and refrain from violating international human rights treaties, as well as allow 
for more robust analyses in asylum cases. 
After providing an overview of international human rights law, Part I argues 
that countries ought to follow international law, and explores the current 
enforcement mechanisms’ ability to compel this compliance. From there, the 
Article moves into its proposal of enforcing international human rights law through 
asylum law. Part II makes the case for importing international human rights law 
into domestic US law in order to increase international law’s influence. Asylum 
law is uniquely compatible with international law, based on its historical roots and 
subject matter. The use of treaties in asylum cases builds on proven mechanisms of 
international law compliance, including norm internalization and increased foreign 
aid, to increase the benefits of complying with international human rights law. 
Part III moves into the specific mechanics of the proposal. To establish the viability 
of this proposal, the Article provides a descriptive analysis of comparator countries’ 
current use of treaties in asylum cases. It concludes by using current trends in US 
asylum cases to frame hypothetical parties’ arguments and addressing 
counterarguments to this proposal. 
I. THE LANDSCAPE: COUNTRIES SHOULD, BUT DON’T, OBEY INTERNATIONAL 
LAW  
This Part begins, in Part I.A, by providing an overview of international 
human rights law. Part I.B builds on this by arguing that following international 
human rights law is a normative good. Finally, Part I.C explores the mechanisms 
that currently encourage countries to abide by international human rights law 
commitments, noting the mismatch between the desire to have countries comply 
with international human rights treaties and their incentives to do so. 
A. International Human Rights Law and Treaties  
International human rights law is the set of instruments adopted by the 
international community to “confer[ ] legal form on inherent human rights.” 6 
Treaties are the primary embodiment of international human rights law. Other legal 
                                                 
6 International Human Rights Law, OHCHR (2017), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/InternationalLaw.aspx. 
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instruments include declarations, guidelines, and principles, which have varying 
degrees of legal authority.7 
There are nine treaties, passed between 1965 and 2006, which the UN 
Office of the High Commissioner considers to be “core” international human rights 
treaties.8 These treaties—which form the basis of this Article’s proposal—codify 
widely accepted rights or protect groups of people that have been historically 
disadvantaged or oppressed. The relevant treaties are: the International Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 9  (ICERD) (1965); 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 10  (ICCPR) (1966); 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 11  (ICESCR) 
(1966); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women 12  (CEDAW) (1979); Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment13 (UNCAT) (1984); Convention 
on the Rights of the Child 14  (CRC) (1989); International Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families15 
(ICMW) (1990); International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from 
Enforced Disappearance16 (CPED) (2006); and the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities17 (CRPD) (2006). 
Because of their centrality to this Article’s proposal, some background on 
the mechanics of treaties is helpful here. Treaties are binding agreements between 
states, governed by the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties18 (“Vienna 
Convention”). Under the Vienna Convention, a treaty is “an international 
agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international 
                                                 
7 Id.  
8 Id.; See also The Core International Human Rights Instruments and Their Monitoring Bodies, 
OHCHR (2016), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CoreInstruments.aspx. 
This list excludes optional protocols. 
9 International Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Dec. 21, 1965, 
660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter ICERD].  
10 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 
[hereinafter ICCPR].  
11 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 
3 [hereinafter ICESCR].  
12 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 
1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW].  
13 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter UNCAT]. 
14 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CRC].  
15 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members 
of their Families, Dec. 8, 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICMW].  
16 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, Dec. 
20, 2006, 2716 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CPED].  
17 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter CRPD]. 
18 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter 
Vienna Convention].  
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law.” 19  Countries adopt treaties through two primary stages: signing and 
ratification (in this Article, “adoption” is used to refer to either the signing or the 
ratification of a treaty).20 First, a designated country official signs the treaty. At this 
point the country cannot take steps that “defeat the object and purpose” of the 
treaty.21 The treaty legally binds the country once the country ratifies the treaty,22 
often a process requiring approval by the domestic legislature.23 In the US, for 
instance, the president alone can sign a treaty, but three-fourths of the Senate must 
vote to ratify the treaty.24  
When adopting a treaty, a country may adopt it in its entirety. It can also 
either adopt only sections of the treaty by making “reservations” or voluntarily 
accept additional obligations by signing the “optional protocol.” A reservation is a 
“unilateral statement” by a country “whereby it purports to exclude or to modify 
the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State.”25 
A reservation to Section 2, for instance, means a country is legally bound to all 
provisions of the treaty except those contained in Section 2. Countries can make 
any reservation not “incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.”26 The 
flip side of the reservation coin is that a country can opt into a treaty having more 
authority over it by adopting an optional protocol.27 Most such optional protocols 
allow countries to voluntarily submit to jurisdiction of treaty committees that 
receive and adjudicate complaints concerning violations of the treaty.28 
B. Countries Should Obey International Human Rights Law 
With this basis in international human rights law, this Article must address 
its primary normative assumption: countries should obey international human 
rights law. If this were not true then there would be little reason to argue that asylum 
law ought to strengthen it. This normative belief has two bases. Even skeptics 
                                                 
19 Id. at § 2(1)(a). See also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE 
(2016),  
http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/faqs/70139.htm. Although the US has never ratified the Vienna 
Convention, it treats it as customary international law, which binds even non-consenting 
countries. 
20 Vienna Convention, supra note 18, at §§ 12–16. 
21 Id. at § 16.  
22 See also id. at § 24. Or once the treaty enters into force, whichever comes later. The treaty 
enters into force once a set number of countries have adopted it. 
23 See Vienna Convention, supra note 18, at § 16. 
24 See U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2, cl. 2. See also The Senate’s Role in Treaties, U.S. SENATE (2016), 
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Treaties.htm  
25 Vienna Convention, supra note 18 at § 2(1)(d). 
26 Id. at § 19(c). For more on prohibited reservations, see generally Roslyn Moloney, 
Incompatible Reservations to Human Rights Treaties: Severability and the Problem of State 
Consent, 5 MELBOURNE J. INT’L. L. 155 (2004).  
27 See The Core International Human Rights Instruments, supra note 8. The ICESCR, ICCPR, 
CEDAW, CRC, UNCAT, and CRPD have optional protocols. 
28 See, e.g., Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, Oct. 6, 1999, 2131 U.N.T.S. 83. 
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generally admit the first: international law is a “source of expectations.”29 As with 
any law, international law aligns expectations and provides notice. 
This argument does not have the same force as the more substantial one: 
international law should be obeyed, simply, because it is the right thing to do. Trite 
as it may sound, the world would be a better place if all countries honored 
international human rights law. Although occasionally raising ideological battles30 
and leading to debates over the degree to which “universal” rights are in fact 
Western rights,31 the core UN treaties protect accepted, largely uncontroversial 
rights such as non-discrimination and due process. The overwhelming number of 
countries that have adopted these treaties demonstrates the universality of respect 
for these rights, at least theoretically.32 Even scholars who dispute the relevance of 
international law do not argue it is bad when countries obey it. 
Perhaps the strongest counterargument to this assertion is that it’s fine to 
support these rights, but that should be done through domestic means. There is 
arguably more force, however, to the idea that a right is truly accepted as global; 
that it transcends domestic borders. Practically speaking, many countries that adopt 
treaties are not yet in a place to pass domestic legislation protecting the same. In 
these situations, international law is an important baby step—not the end, but the 
beginning, of rights recognition. For example, Saudi Arabia has adopted CEDAW33 
despite “deeply entrenched discrimination” within its domestic legal system, 
including the requirement that a woman have a male guardian responsible for her 
legal decisions.34  
                                                 
29 Eric A. Posner, Do States Have a Moral Obligation to Obey International Law?, 55 STAN. L. 
REV. 1901, 1902 (2003).  
30 The ratification of ICESCR led to an ideological split during the Cold War between “Western” 
countries supporting civil and political “negative” rights and those aligned with the USSR, which 
argued for social, “positive” rights (requiring affirmative government services); See Philip 
Alston, Putting Economic Social, and Cultural Rights Back on the Agenda of the United States, in 
THE FUTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS: U.S. POLICY FOR A NEW ERA 122 (William F. Schulz ed., 
2008). 
31 See Shashi Tharoor, Are Human Rights Universal?, 16 WORLD POL’Y J. 1 (2000) (“The 
growing consensus in the West that human rights are universal has been fiercely opposed by 
critics in other parts of the world.”). See also generally, e.g., Surya P. Subedi, Are the Principles 
of Human Rights “Western” Ideas? An Analysis of the Claim of the “Asian” Concept of Human 
Rights from the Perspectives of Hinduism, 30 CAL. WESTERN INT’L. L. J. 45 (1999) (framing 
human rights from a non-Western perspective).  
32 See The Core International Human Rights Instruments, supra note 8. All but ten countries have 
signed more than five international human rights treaties and optional protocols; the vast majority 
has signed over ten. 
33 See Saudi Arabia – Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard, OHCHR (2016),  
http://indicators.ohchr.org/. 
34 Boxed In: Women and Saudi Arabia’s Male Guardianship System, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 
(July 16, 2016), https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/07/16/boxed/women-and-saudi-arabias-male-
guardianship-system. 
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Skeptics of international law would argue that Saudi Arabia is using 
CEDAW as window dressing without meaningful behavior change. This is an 
argument not truly about the wisdom of international law, however, but about the 
ability of international law to effect positive change, to nudge countries towards 
respecting rights. And this is the place into which this Article’s proposal inserts 
itself: the power of international treaties to enforce rights that ought to be enforced.   
C. Existing Enforcement Mechanisms—And Their Failure to Deliver  
There are both formal and informal mechanisms to enforce international 
human rights law, which this Section introduces. Although the inefficacy of these 
enforcement mechanisms is at times overstated, the widespread violations of 
international human rights treaties by countries throughout the world speak for 
themselves: these enforcement mechanisms are not doing enough.  
i. Formal Enforcement Mechanisms 
The trope about international law not having formal sanctions or 
enforcement mechanisms is not, technically, true. There is actually a sprawling set 
of formal tribunals. Several treaties allow countries to opt in to the jurisdiction of 
treaty committees.35 Venues such as the International Court of Justice36 and the 
United Nations Human Rights Council37 process and adjudicate complaints.  
Where these formal enforcement mechanisms do exist, however, they are 
voluntary, “weak,” or “deficient.”38 The experience of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) illustrates these limitations: Created in 1998 and lauded as “extremely 
efficient and successful,”39 the ICC’s weaknesses were exposed in 2017 as several 
African countries announced plans to withdraw from the jurisdiction of the court, 
citing bias against African countries. 40  The ICC’s experience shows how an 
international forum that energetically fulfills its mandate may risk triggering an 
                                                 
35 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, Oct. 6, 1999, 2131 U.N.T.S. 83.  
36 See International Court of Justice: The Court, ICJ (2017),  
http://www.icj-cij.org/homepage/. 
37 See Human Rights Council Complaint Procedure, OHCHR (2017), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/ComplaintProcedure/Pages/HRCComplaintProcedureI
ndex.aspx. 
38 Eric Neumayer, Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights?, 
49 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 925, 926 (2005).  
39 Daniel Donovan, International Criminal Court: Successes and Failures, INT’L POL’Y DIG. 
(Mar. 23, 2012), https://intpolicydigest.org/2012/03/23/international-criminal-court-successes-
and-failures/. 
40 Norimitsu Onishi, South Africa Reverses Withdrawal From International Criminal Court, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 8, 2017),  
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/08/world/africa/south-africa-icc-withdrawal.html. 
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exodus, as countries find the benefits of submitting to its jurisdiction outweighed 
by the cost of this voluntary legal exposure.  
ii. Informal Enforcement Mechanisms 
Beyond these formal enforcement mechanisms, several informal 
mechanisms enforce international law. The perceived viability of such enforcement 
mechanisms varies considerably. Realist scholars such as Professors Jack 
Goldsmith and Eric Posner dispute that international law holds any intrinsic power 
separate from that which countries give it to advance their own interests.41 When 
treaty provisions and state action align, realists see the alignment as a “coincidence 
of interest” that originates in the national self-interests of the adopting countries.42  
International institutionalists, such as Professors Harold Koh and Oona 
Hathaway, are correct to find that arguments along these lines “give shape to only 
parts of the blind men’s elephant.” 43  Institutionalists have offered numerous 
theories purporting to explain the informal power of international law to shape the 
behavior of countries, with three primary explanations emerging: norm 
internalization; domestic pressure; and recognition that international law can be 
used as an advantageous signaling device.44  
Norm internalization is particularly relevant to this Article. 45  The 
“touchstone” here is “that identification with a reference group generates varying 
degrees of cognitive and social pressures—real or imagined—to conform.”46 Koh 
points to numerous times where norm internalization and related pressures led to 
the US conforming its behavior to international law in a way that “neither interest, 
identity, or international society” can explain.47 These include the US internalizing 
the norms of the UN’s landmines treaty (even without adopting the treaty) by 
changing its approach to landmines quickly after the UN’s passage of the 
convention, instituting a moratorium, and pledging over $100 million a year to 
                                                 
41 See generally JACK L. GOLDSMITH AND ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(2005). 
42 Id. at 111.  
43 Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L. J. 2599, 2602 
(1997).  
44 This Article, as with most other scholarship concerning the power of international human rights 
treaties, does not explore the use of military intervention. For more on the connection between 
human rights enforcement and military intervention, see generally Sueng-Whan Choi and Patrick 
James, Why Does the US Intervene Abroad? Democracy, Human Rights Violations, and 
Terrorism, 60 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 899 (2016). 
45 See Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, supra note 43, at 2602–03.  
46 See Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and International 
Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L. J. 621, 626–27 (2004). 
47 Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, supra note 43, at 2648. 
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eradicating landmines.48 The US also gradually adopted UN-promoted anti-torture 
norms in its domestic legal system after the passage of the UNCAT.49 
Domestic pressure, often from civil society, can also drive compliance with 
international law. 50  This pressure can take the form of “naming and shaming 
governments for failure to comply, mobilizing citizens to pressure their 
governments, or teaming up with more powerful states to leverage changes in 
human rights protections.”51 Generally speaking, this mechanism is more powerful 
in democratic countries where “powerful actors can hold the government to 
account,” as opposed to authoritarian countries that lack parallel institutions.52 
Democratic countries that have adopted the UNCAT and ICCPR have lower rates 
of torture and civil liberty abuses, respectively, than those that have not; the same 
is not true of authoritarian countries.53  
Finally, international law acts as a signaling mechanism that countries 
recognize can boost their reputation, improve international relations, and gain other 
collateral benefits, namely increased foreign aid, trade, and investment. 54  This 
occurs because signing onto international commitments demonstrably “tie[s] the 
hands” of political leaders by “increasing the cost of reneging.” 55  Such costs 
include diminished reputation and credibility, from the perspective of both the 
country’s domestic and international audiences. 56  In addition, committing to a 
treaty can lead international investors and countries to commit investment funds 
and foreign aid to a country.57 The World Bank “frequently” considers a country’s 
human rights record when making loan determinations; the European Union 
requires that countries adopt several human rights treaties before entering the 
Union.58 Economic sanctions take the stick, rather than the carrot, approach, and 
                                                 
48 See Harold Hongju Koh, How is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74 INDIANA L. J. 
1397, 1412 (1999).  
49 See id. 
50 See Oona A. Hathaway, Why Do Countries Commit to Human Rights Treaties?, 51 J. 
CONFLICT RESOL. 588, 596 (2007). 
51 HEATHER SMITH-CANNOY, INSINCERE COMMITMENTS: HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES, ABUSIVE 
STATES, AND CITIZEN ACTIVISM 34 (2012). 
52 Hathaway, supra note 50, at 593.  
53 See id.  
54 See Daniel A. Farber, Rights as Signals, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 88–94 (2002); Hathaway, supra 
note 50, at 592. 
55 Michael Tomz, Reputation and the Effect of International Law on Preferences and Belief  5 
(Stan. Uni., Working Paper, 2008).  
https://web.stanford.edu/~tomz/working/Tomz-IntlLaw-2008-02-11a.pdf. 
56 See id. See also Roda Mushkat, State Reputation and Compliance with International Law: 
Looking Through a Chinese Lens, 10 Chinese J. INT’L L. 703, 731 (2011). 
57 Hathaway, supra note 50, at 596–97. See also Joel P. Trachtman, Who Cares about 
International Human Rights?: The Supply and Demand of International Human Rights Law, 44 
INT’L L. & POL. 851, 856 (2012); Arvind Magesan, Human Rights Treaty Ratification of Aid 
Receiving Countries, 45 WORLD DEV. 175, 180 (2013) (finding that the adoption of international 
human rights treaties is statistically significantly correlated to increased foreign aid).  
58 See Hathaway, supra note 50, at 596. 
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countries’ compliance with international human rights law can lead to the lifting of 
such sanctions.59 
iii. These Enforcement Mechanisms Do Not Tip the Scale  
For our purposes, there is no need to get bogged down into the precise power 
of each of these enforcement mechanisms, already covered extensively in other 
scholarship.60 It is enough to say that these enforcement mechanisms have made 
inroads into enforcing international law, but they’ve been insufficient. Research 
suggests that treaty adoption modestly improves human rights compliance. 61 
Precise empirics can be debated; what cannot is that international law has not 
fulfilled its mandate. A representative snapshot shows that worldwide, 30 million 
people work against their will in slave-like conditions;62 1-in-3 girls under the age 
of 18 in developing countries are married;63 and 77 percent of the population face 
significant restrictions on religious practices.64 
International human rights law can and does currently influence countries. 
That does not change that, in the end, countries are under-incentivized to comply 
with international human rights law. The benefits that countries believe they accrue 
from violating human rights (such as maintaining control, decreasing crime, and 
promoting economic development) 65  too often outweigh the benefits from 
upholding them.  
Although not central to this Article’s argument, it worth noting that 
international human rights law differently affects subsets of countries. Developed 
countries more frequently comply with international law, both due to genuine 
commitment to the ideals and the fact that they often drafted the agreements with 
which they are complying. 66  Meanwhile, scholars generally believe that 
international law most strongly influences transitioning democracies such as 
Ecuador and South Africa.67 Such countries are the most susceptible to informal 
                                                 
59 See id. at 592. See also generally Aryeh Neier, Sanctions and Human Rights, 82 SOC. RES. 875 
(2015).  
60 See, e.g., Neumayer, supra note 38; Oona Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a 
Difference?, 111 Yale L J 1935 (2002).  
61 In autocracies, some variables showed negative effects after treaty adoption. See Hathaway, 
supra note 50, at 596. 
62 Posner, supra note 5. 
63 Nisha Varia, Ending Child Marriage: Meeting the Global Development Goals’ Promise to 
Girls, HUMAN RTS. WATCH (2016),  
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/ending-child-marriage. 
64 Latest Trends in Religious Restrictions and Hostilities, PEW RES. CTR, (Feb. 26, 2015), 
http://www.pewforum.org/2015/02/26/religious-hostilities/.  
65 Posner, The Case Against Human Rights, supra note 5. 
66 See GOLDSMITH AND POSNER, supra note 41, at 111; Neumayer, supra note 38, at 940–49. 
67 See Tom Ginsburg, Locking in Democracy: Constitutions, Commitment, and International Law, 
38 INT’L L. & POL. 707, 753–57 (2006); Smith-Cannoy, supra note 51, at 34–36; Simon Hug and 
Simone Wegmann, Complying with Human Rights, 42 INT’L INTERACTIONS 590, 592–98 (2016).  
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enforcement mechanisms, including a reliance on foreign aid and a desire to 
integrate into communities such as the European Union. Authoritarian “antisocial” 
regimes such as North Korea, on the other hand, have intentionally distanced 
themselves from the international community. These countries have weaker 
institutions to hold governments accountable.68 Though even North Korea is a UN 
member state and has adopted some treaties,69 its apparent lack of interest in treaty 
compliance put it squarely in the group of regimes most resistant to the influence 
of international human rights law.  
II. DOMESTIC US ASYLUM LAW: A NEW ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM  
 This Part argues that, given the failure of existing enforcement mechanisms, 
international human rights law ought to be assimilated into domestic US law as a 
means to create new pressure on countries not to violate human rights. After 
providing background on asylum law, this Part discusses the unique aspects of 
asylum law that make this pairing natural and particularly fruitful.  
A. Why It Is Worth Finding a Niche for International Law in Domestic US 
Law  
This proposal finds itself in a hostile environment: the US and its judiciary 
are famously wary of international law.70 The US has not signed widely accepted 
treaties, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child, and the Mine Ban Treaty, all signed by over 150 countries; 
every single country except for the US and South Sudan has adopted the CRC.71  
Despite the US’s resistance to allowing international law to meddle with its 
internal affairs, this Article proposes an enhanced degree of reliance by US courts 
on international law. Two impetuses drive this proposal, one facing outwards and 
one inwards. The outwards facing argument is of primary significance: increasing 
the role of international law in domestic US law will serve as a new enforcement 
mechanism to increase the cost of violating international human rights law. A 
country that violates international human rights law under this proposal faces the 
general consequences of violation as well as a new cost: its citizens are more likely 
to be granted asylum in the US on the grounds of persecution (Part II.B.ii discusses 
why this is a cost).  
                                                 
68 Hathaway, supra note 50, at 593. 
69 See Democratic People’s Republic of Korea – Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard, 
OHCHR (2016),  
http://indicators.ohchr.org/. 
70 See generally Linda S. Bishai, America’s Love/Hate Relationship with International Law, 34 
REV. OF INT’L STUD. 425 (2008).  
71 See Joshua Keating, America the Exception: 7 Other Treaties the U.S. Hasn’t Ratified, 
FOREIGN POL’Y (May 17, 2012),  
http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/05/17/america-the-exception-7-other-treaties-the-u-s-hasnt-
ratified/. 
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Because of the US’s historic aversion towards international law and its 
uniquely powerful role in the world, its use of international law will exert more 
pressure on other countries than would the adoption of this proposal by a different 
country. Although this may seem counterintuitive—why would other countries 
listen to a country that has itself eschews international law?—this argument aligns 
with what already happens. There exists a “curious tension between the consistent 
rejection of the application of international norms [in the U.S.], on the one hand, 
and the venerable U.S. tradition of support for human rights.” 72  “[V]igorous” 
attempts by the US to “enforce global human rights standards through rhetorical 
disapproval, foreign aid, sanctions, military intervention, and even multilateral 
negotiations” surpass those of any other country.73 Even when it has not signed on 
to a treaty, the US often helps draft it; it “initiated” seven of the articles included in 
the CRC.74 The US commonly refrains from adopting international human rights 
treaties due to concerns about domestic sovereignty, not based on actual 
disapproval of the norms espoused in the treaty, explaining some of this apparent 
tension.75  
The corresponding, inwards facing argument is that the US is not shielded 
from the effects of norm internalization. In other words, the US’s role is not solely 
to fix other countries. Because this proposal uses treaties to assess other countries’ 
behavior, not to bind the US, concerns about domestic sovereignty should be 
assuaged; the US does not need to cede power to any international actor. On the 
other hand, the US already showed in the UNCAT and other contexts that it is 
receptive to norm internalization.76 The same ought to be true for other international 
human rights treaties. In this way, relying on international law in domestic law 
should not just make other countries better, but for the same reasons improve the 
US. 
B. The Ideal Conduit for International Human Rights Law: Domestic US 
Asylum Law  
Domestic US law has unique potential to increase compliance with 
international human rights law; within domestic US law, asylum law is the field 
that will most successfully do so. After introducing domestic US asylum law, this 
                                                 
72 Andrew Moravcsik, The Paradox of U.S. Human Rights Policy 147, in AMERICAN 
EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005). 
73 Id. at 147–48. 
74 Thalif Deen, US May Soon Stand Alone Opposing Children’s Treaty, COMMON DREAMS (Jan. 
23, 2015), https://www.commondreams.org/news/2015/01/23/us-may-soon-stand-alone-
opposing-childrens-treaty. 
75 See United States Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties, HUMAN RTS. WATCH 
(July 24, 2009), https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/07/24/united-states-ratification-international-
human-rights-treaties (“The treaties espouse non-discrimination, due process, and other core 
values that most American[s] unquestionably support. They are also largely consistent with 
existing US law and practice.”). 
76 See Koh, How is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, supra note 48, at 1414. 
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Section argues that asylum law is particularly conducive to this proposal due to 
historical and substantive links between international law and asylum law.  
At this point, it is important to note that this Article does not submit that 
relying on treaties is the panacea to inadequacies of the asylum process. As Part III 
addresses, this proposal will improve the robustness of domestic asylum cases by 
adding relevant evidence into the analyses. If policymakers aim to fix asylum 
procedures in the US, though, they should start elsewhere. They would be wise to 
provide increased training for immigration judges;77 divert additional resources to 
these courts;78 or address the wildly inconsistent rates of how different judges rule 
on asylum cases.79 Others have written on how to most improve the integrity and 
competency of immigration courts.80 These are valid and necessary considerations, 
but not the core concern of this Article’s proposal.  
i. Domestic US Asylum Law 
This Section offers an overview of domestic US asylum law mechanics to 
inform this Article’s proposal. The bird’s-eye view is that an asylum seeker is a 
person physically in the US who meets the definition of refugee,81 as articulated by 
the Immigration and Nationality Act.82 The Attorney General decides whether to 
grant asylum; the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its Office of 
Citizenship and Immigration Services(USCIS) oversee the process.83  
                                                 
77 See Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 830 (7th Cir. 2005) (Posner) (“the adjudication of 
these cases at the administrative level has fallen below the minimum standards of legal justice.”). 
78 See Immigration Court Backlog Continues to Grow, HUM. RTS. FIRST (Jan. 18, 2017), 
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/press-release/immigration-court-backlog-continues-grow 
(remarking on “an all-time high backlog of 533,909 pending cases.”). 
79 See generally Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., 60 STAN. L. REV. 295 (2010). An applicant in Newark 
between 2011 and 2016 could have had an 84.3% chance of receiving asylum if he were assigned 
Judge Frederic G. Leeds—or a 1.4% chance if he had the misfortune to argue before Judge 
Margaret R. Reichenberg. See Judge-by-Judge Asylum Decisions in Immigration Courts FY 
2011–2016, TRAC IMMIGRATION, (2016), 
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/447/include/denialrates.html. 
80 For a few of the many articles addressing this issue, see generally Michele Benedetto, Crisis on 
the Immigration Bench, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 467 (2008); Erin B. Corcoran, Seek Justice, Not Just 
Deportation: How to Improve Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, 48 LOY. L. A. L. 
REV. 119 (2014). 
81 See Refugees & Asylum, U.S. OFF. OF CITIZENSHIP & IMMIG. SERVICES (2017), 
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum. A “refugee” is a person outside of the US 
who comes to the US under the Refugee Resettlement program, among other requirements. See 
Refugee Admissions, U.S. DEPT. OF ST. (2017),  
https://www.state.gov/j/prm/ra/. The terms are often conflated. This Article focuses on asylum 
seekers because theirs are the cases that arise in domestic courts.  
82 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2012). 
83 See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a). See also, e.g., INS v Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992). 
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Generally speaking, an applicant begins by sending in an application to 
USCIS. 84  Asylum officers, housed within regional offices, then interview the 
applicant in a non-adversarial setting. Asylum officers sometimes make asylum 
determinations; more often the officer refers the applicant for a de novo, adversarial 
hearing before an immigration judge (IJ). An attorney housed in the Bureau of 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) argues for the government. 85 
Hearings usually last two to four hours.86 The applicant and any witnesses can be 
cross-examined; applicants provide counsel at their own expense.87 The IJ often 
issues an oral decision at the hearing, but may release a written decision at a later 
date.88 Unless there are “exceptional circumstances,” the entire asylum process is 
supposed to take at most 180 days.89 Either party can then appeal the decision to 
the Board of Immigration Affairs (BIA) and ultimately to a federal circuit court.90  
The substantive law underlying asylum decisions, key to this Article’s 
proposal, is that an individual must be “unable or unwilling to return to, and [ ] 
unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country 
because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion” 
in order to receive asylum.91 The cruxes of an asylum claim are (1) demonstrating 
membership in a protected category and (2) proving persecution.92 An applicant 
must then show a “nexus” between these two factors. 93  Although four of the 
protected categories (race, religion, nationality, and political opinion) are relatively 
self-explanatory, “particular social group” (PSG) is defined neither by neither 
treaty nor statute. The BIA defines PSG as “a group of persons all of whom share 
a common, immutable characteristic,”94 and courts in turn classify PSGs on a case-
by-case basis. Past PSGs include “homosexuals in Cuba who were forced to register 
                                                 
84 Applicants apply for asylum from two different routes: affirmatively and defensively. Asylum 
seekers apply for asylum affirmatively when, within a year of their arrival in the US, they apply 
for asylum. Meanwhile, they apply defensively when raising asylum as a defense against removal 
proceedings.  
85 See Ramji-Nogales, supra note 79, at 305–06. 
86 See id. at 308–09.  
87 See id.; Immigration Court Proceedings, IMMIGRATION EQUALITY (2017), 
http://www.immigrationequality.org/get-legal-help/our-legal-resources/immigration-equality-
asylum-manual/immigration-court-proceedings/. 
88 See Immigration Court Proceedings, supra note 87. 
89 How Long Does the Process Take?, USCIS (2017),  
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/faq/how-long-does-process-take 
(acknowledging, that due to “expanding caseloads,” the intended timelines are often not met). 
90 For a detailed explanation of the asylum process, see Obtaining Asylum in the United States, 
USCIC (2017), https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/obtaining-asylum-
united-states 
91 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A), 1158(a) (2012). 
92 See Li v. Holder, 559 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009). 
93 See id. 
94 Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081, 1083 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Matter of Acosta, 19 I 
& N Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985)).  
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with the government; young female members of a tribe in Togo who had not 
undergone female genital mutilation and were opposed to the practice; and Filipinos 
of mixed Filipino–Chinese ancestry.”95 PSGs must have “particularity” and “social 
visibility,” 96  demonstrated by establishing “that society in general perceives, 
considers, or recognizes persons sharing the particular characteristic to be a 
group.”97  
Persecution on the basis of membership in a protected category is a high bar 
to meet. US courts understand persecution as “an extreme concept that does not 
include every sort of treatment our society regards as offensive.”98 For example, 
the treatment of feminists in Iran in the early 1990’s did not rise to the level of 
persecution. 99  Asylum seekers can prove persecution either by showing direct 
persecution of the individual by their government or by demonstrating that the 
government is “unable or unwilling” to protect the asylum seeker from persecution 
by a private party.100 As a general matter, courts analyze persecution using an 
objective standard,101 though they do sometimes allow some leeway for a country’s 
culture in asylum decisions.102  
Asylum decisions often turn on particularized facts specific to the applicant 
at bar. Courts also rely on evidence about the situation in the applicant’s country, 
though, including materials cited in “country condition reports.”103 This evidence 
helps corroborate or rebut applicants’ claims. Asylum officers and immigration 
judges often “rely heavily” on these reports.104 Both the applicant and government 
parties in an asylum case submit country condition reports.105 Often hundreds of 
pages long, the reports incorporate documents demonstrating governmental 
                                                 
95 Henriquez-Rivas, 707 F.3d at 1084. 
96 Matter of C–A–, 23 I & N Dec. 951, 957, 960 (BIA 2006). 
97 Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125, 1131–32 (9th Cir. 2016) (emphasis in original). 
98 Ghaly v. I.N.S., 58 F.3d 1425, 1431 (9th Cir. 1995) (citations and quotation marks omitted). 
99 See Fatin v. I.N.S, 12 F.3d 1233, 1243 (3d Cir. 1993). 
100 See, e.g., Castro-Perez v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir 2005) (noting that an 
applicant failed to show that “the government of Honduras is unable or unwilling to control rape 
in that country.”).  
101 See, e.g., Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 796 (9th Cir. 2005) (“We reject the 
government’s suggestion that female genital mutilation cannot be a basis for a claim of past 
persecution because it is widely-accepted and widely-practiced.”) (citations and quotation marks 
omitted). 
102 See, e.g., Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1237 (“Rejecting this argument, the Board stated that there was no 
evidence that [the applicant] would be ‘singled out’ for persecution. . . . [S]he would be ‘subject 
to the same restrictions and requirements’ as the rest of the population.”) (citations omitted). 
103 See 8 C.F.R. § 208.12(a) (“[T]he asylum officer may rely on material provided by the 
Department of State, other USCIS offices, or other credible sources, such as international 
organizations”); Country Conditions Research, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Feb. 24, 2017),  
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/country-conditions-research. 
104 See Immigration Court Proceedings, supra note 87. 
105 See id.; I-589 Application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal, USCIS (2017), 
https://www.uscis.gov/i-589.  (“[The applicant] must attach documents evidencing the general 
conditions in the country from which you are seeking asylum.”). 
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behavior and attitude towards protected groups as they relate to the applicant’s 
claim,106 including research from government and nongovernmental bodies, such 
as the United States State Department, Human Rights Watch, and Amnesty 
International. 107  For many human rights abuses, information contained in the 
reports “carry a great deal of weight” because the adjudicators have little access to 
the conditions in specific countries.108  
There are two related areas of law to which the proposal in this Article also 
generally applies, though it focuses on traditional asylum law. First are withholding 
of removal cases. An immigration judge can grant a withholding of removal if the 
applicant demonstrates that he would be eligible for asylum but for narrowly 
defined exceptions, and he meets other criteria.109 An applicant can also apply for 
relief under the UN Convention Against Torture.110 Both types of cases rely on 
similar facts as asylum cases, and can interact with treaties in much the same way 
imagined in this proposal. 
ii. International Human Rights Law and Domestic US Asylum Law Are 
Uniquely Compatible  
 Although there are other areas of domestic US law where international 
human rights law could be imported, asylum law is uniquely suited to integrating 
with international human rights law.  
a) US Asylum Law Historically Reflects International Law. Despite 
resistance to international law in US domestic courts, asylum law is already deeply 
influenced by international law. In fact, the language of US asylum laws is identical 
to that of similar countries’ because all are taken from the 1967 UN Protocol 
Relating to the Status of Refugees in order to fulfill each country’s legal 
obligations.111 Domestic US asylum law takes its very phrasing from international 
human rights treaties.  
                                                 
106 See Long Bao Hua v. Holder, 435 F. Appx. 631, 632 (9th Cir. 2011); Asylum Law & 
Convention Against Torture: Country Conditions, CORNELL UNIV. LIBRARY (2017), 
http://guides.library.cornell.edu/c.php?g=32278&p=203431. 
107 See, e.g., Long Bao Hua v. Holder, 435 F. Appx. 631, 632 (9th Cir. 2011); In re Kasinga, 21 I 
& N Dec 357, 361–62 (BIA 1996) (while considering asylum claim, discussing conditions for 
women in Togo as a whole, based on evidence from the “FGM Alert” and a State Department 
report); Kacalniku v. Holder, 407 F. Appx. 182, 184 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Human Rights Watch 
report); Garcia v. Holder, 756 F.3d 885, 889 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing Transparency International 
findings).  
108 Immigration Court Proceedings, supra note 87. 
109 See 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a)(1) (2012). See also 8 C.F.R. § 208.16; INA § 241(b)(3)(C). 
110 See UNCAT, supra note 13. See also 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16, 1208.17, 1208.18. 
111 See G.A. Res. 2198 (XXI), Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, at § 1(a)(2) (1967). 
See also United States of America – Status of Ratifications Interactive Dashboard, OHCHR 
(2014) 
http://indicators.ohchr.org/. (scroll down“Countries” list; select “United States of America”). 
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US courts have acknowledged this connection. In discussing the potential 
relevance of international law to asylum law, the courts have recognized that, a 
“primary purpose for which Congress adopted this definition in 1980 was ‘to bring 
United States refugee law into conformance with the [Refugee Protocol].’” 112 
Relevant government agencies, such as USCIS, also incorporate international 
materials into their directions to their staff working on asylum matters.113 As such, 
despite general US resistance to the specter of international rule, asylum law has 
historically reflected international law. This historic connection suggests that 
increasing the profile of international law in domestic asylum law should trigger 
less domestic resistance than would doing the same in an area of law more cordoned 
off from international influence.  
b) The Subject Matters of Domestic Asylum and International Human 
Rights Law Align. Moreover, asylum law is the ideal area of law through which to 
integrate international human rights law into the domestic US legal system because 
their subject matter are indisputably interrelated. The same motivating concern of 
asylum—to protect non-citizens who are not covered by domestic legal protections 
but who fear persecution abroad—dovetails with the purpose of international 
human rights law, to allow people to live “free[ ] from fear.”114  
The substance of each area of law therefore closely informs the other. 
Within asylum law, courts question whether individuals have been persecuted on 
the basis of their race, religion, nationality, membership in a PSG, or political 
opinion. These inquiries directly track the focus of various treaties. For example, 
protections owed to the PSG defined as “young female members of a tribe in Togo 
who had not undergone female genital mutilation and were opposed to the 
practice” 115  may implicate women’s rights (CEDAW), familial protections 
(ICESCR), and torture (UNCAT).116  
iii. Adopting This Proposal Will Increase Enforcement of International 
Human Rights Law 
The parallels between international human rights law and asylum law segue 
into the reasons why asylum law is a credible additional enforcement mechanism 
for international law. This proposal capitalizes on the forces that have proven 
successful in enforcing international law in the past, namely norm internalization 
and collateral benefits of compliance. Additionally, countries dislike it when their 
nationals are granted asylum in other countries. If these countries see that 
                                                 
112 Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187, 1194 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing INS v. Cardoza–Fonseca, 480 
U.S. 421, 436 (1987)).  
113 See, e.g., Lesson Plan Overview: Asylum Officer Basic Training – Female Asylum Applicants 
and Gender-Related Claims. USCIS– RAIO – ASYLUM DIVISION 7 (Mar. 12, 2009) (discussing 
how international law resources can help determine whether women have faced persecution). 
114 ICCPR, supra note 10.  
115 Henriquez-Rivas, 707 F.3d at 1084. 
116 See, e.g., CEDAW § 16; ICESCR § 10(3); UNCAT § 1. 
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complying with treaties will decrease such grants of asylum, they will have an 
increased reason to comply.  
a) Domestic asylum law as an enforcement mechanism builds off the 
informal enforcement mechanisms that have proven, albeit modest, success in 
compelling country compliance.117 As Koh and Hathaway have shown, successful 
informal enforcement mechanisms include norm internalization and countries’ 
interest in reaping the collateral gains of respecting human rights. We can expect 
the increased use of international human rights treaties in domestic asylum law, 
particularly by the US, to have the same internalization effects as the dissemination 
of international law in other contexts.  
Regarding collateral consequences, countries that are consistently called out 
as violating their citizens’ human rights see reduced foreign aid, military support, 
and international investment.118 Asylum cases are one area where countries face 
this exact form of criticism. If US courts take seriously the status of a country’s 
adoption of a human rights treaty in their analysis, then countries will have added 
incentive to adopt these treaties. Adopting, and complying with, human rights 
treaties is an effective way for countries to signal to domestic US courts—as well 
as investors—that the countries take seriously their citizens’ human rights. This, in 
turn, will lead to fewer findings of persecution, findings that would jeopardize the 
country’s foreign aid and investment. In this way, this proposal encourages 
countries, for their own self-interest, to comply with these treaties. 
b) Countries do not want their citizens granted asylum, so this proposal 
creates new impetus for countries to comply with international human rights 
treaties.119 A related argument that raises many of the same issues is that countries 
care about the results of their citizens’ asylum applications abroad. Although no 
empirical research tests this claim, it holds up theoretically and anecdotally. A 
finding of persecution in an asylum case shows that the accepting country believes 
that the asylum seeker’s home country is, at best, failing to protect its citizens. 
Findings for asylum harshly denounce the asylum seeker’s home country. 120 
Theoretically, applicants’ home countries have several reasons why they would not 
                                                 
117 See Part I.C.ii of this Article. 
118 See Posner, supra note 5, and accompanying text; Simone Dietrich and Amanda Murdie, 
Human Rights Shaming Through INGOs and Foreign Aid Delivery, 12 THE REV. INT’L ORG. 95–
100 (2017) (discussing how shaming by international NGOs about countries’ human rights 
records generally reduces aid from foreign governments). 
119 See Part III.B of this Article for a discussion on how this proposal prevents abuse by countries 
that hope to use the adoption of treaties as a way to curtail findings of persecution without 
seriously changing their behavior. 
120 See, e.g., FH-T v. Holder, 743 F.3d 1077, 1078 (7th Cir. 2014) (discussing the “horrendous 
conditions” the Eritrean applicant faced after the country’s ruling party was not “amused” at his 
behavior). 
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want their citizens to be granted asylum abroad. Foreign aid, trade, and investment 
are in jeopardy; countries also care about their national reputation and image.121 
Anecdotally, countries bristle at the insult of asylum to their citizens. China 
is openly upset when countries grant its political dissidents asylum status.122 Cuba 
has taken to granting asylum to fleeing US citizens accused of crimes to retaliate 
against the US’s decision to “give[ ] shelter to dozens and dozens of Cuban 
citizens.”123 The US similarly resents when other countries offer asylum to its 
citizens. In one case, Costa Rico granted asylum to Chere Lyn Tomayko, a US 
citizen who fled with her children after facing domestic abuse. Condemning Costa 
Rica’s decision, the US Embassy asserted that Costa Rico was violating its treaty 
obligations and that it “absolutely disagree[d] with the implied assumption that the 
U.S. judicial system could not protect Ms. Tomayko.”124 The US has similarly 
rejected that it would abuse the jurisdiction it holds over its citizens and that it does 
not serve justice at home, as seen in the Edward Snowden case.125  
*** 
This proposal does not claim to offer a way to guarantee universal 
compliance with international human rights law. That logic would, in a way, be 
circular: individuals would not have to seek asylum if their countries respected their 
human rights, so why would a country begin respecting those rights just to prevent 
asylum grants abroad? After all, courts grant asylum every day. Countries already 
bristle at these grants. Countries can always improve their human rights record to 
decrease the number of asylum seekers they create.  
Instead, this proposal suggests that the current asylum system leaves 
unfulfilled and underdeveloped its potential to change countries’ behavior. 
Countries do not wish for other countries to consider their citizens “persecuted” for 
reputational, monetary, and political reasons. Reliance on treaties in asylum 
determinations should therefore nudge countries towards adopting and complying 
with treaties. Explicitly bringing international human rights law into asylum cases 
will officially link compliance with international law to the benefits addressed in 
this Article, and offer specific steps for countries to take to avoid asylum findings. 
                                                 
121 See Part I.C.ii. of this Article. 
122 See, e.g., No escape? China's crackdown on dissent goes global, CNN (Feb. 4, 2016), 
http://www.cnn.com/2016/02/04/asia/china-dissident-crackdown-goes-global/.  
123 Michael Weissenstein and Andrea Rodriguez, Cuba Says It Has a Right to Grant Asylum to 
US Fugitives, WASH. TIMES (Dec. 22, 2014), 
 http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/dec/22/cuba-asylum-for-fugitives-is-legitimate-
right/. 
124 Response to Tomayko Case, EMBASSY OF THE U. S, SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA (July 24, 2008), 
https://costarica.usembassy.gov/press-releases/2009/-response-to-tomayko-case-july-24th-
2008.html. 
125 See Isabel Gorst, Russia gives Edward Snowden asylum for three more years, L.A. TIMES 
(Aug. 7, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-russia-snowden-asylum-20140807-
story.html. 
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Lifting asylum decisions out of parochial domestic jurisprudence and into a 
common language with which applicants’ countries are familiar will offer countries 
a concrete step to take—adopting a treaty—that will affect case outcomes on the 
margin. And it’s okay if countries are only adopting treaties for this calculated 
purpose. Adoption of a treaty increases norm internalization, gives domestic 
advocates a new tool to use in driving government policy change, and creates new 
monetary and reputational incentives for compliance. The interaction of these 
aspects of international human rights law means that relying on it in asylum cases 
ought to compel additional country compliance.  
III.  THE PROPOSAL: USING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES AS 
EVIDENCE IN DOMESTIC US ASYLUM CASES 
With this reasoning as background, the discussion can now move on to the 
proposal itself, namely that parties in asylum cases should integrate treaty adoption 
and compliance into their arguments. Using current practice in comparator 
countries as precedent, this Part looks at the lack of reliance on treaties in US 
asylum cases and demonstrates how this status quo ought to change.  
A. Theoretical Uses of Treaties in US Asylum Cases 
There are several ways that parties ought to take advantage of treaty 
adoption and compliance during the asylum process. The most straightforward 
arguments for both parties concern the gateway decision of whether a home country 
adopted a treaty. Asylum seekers can argue that by declining to adopt a relevant 
treaty, their home country has opted out of the readily available protections afforded 
by the treaty. Such a choice counsels in favor of a finding of persecution by that 
country. In addition, remember that countries have the option to sign a treaty, 
accumulate additional obligations by ratifying it, and even accept the optional 
protocol.126 On this spectrum, an applicant has a stronger case when a country has 
not even signed a treaty, and the weakest case when it has signed on to the optional 
protocol. Applicants can also point out that their country only adopted the treaty 
subject to material reservations. These arguments may prove to be particularly 
relevant when the applicant is arguing for asylum based on private persecution that 
the government is “unwilling” to prevent. The choice to not adopt protections for 
those precise individuals directly supports the accusation that a country is unwilling 
to prevent persecution: the treaty presents an internationally accepted, ready-to-go 
mechanism by which the country could have committed to protecting those 
individuals.  
For its part, the government can make largely the reverse arguments. Where 
an asylum seeker’s home country has ratified a relevant treaty without reservations 
and particularly when it has accepted the optional protocol, the government can use 
this country’s commitment as evidence that the asylum seeker does not face 
persecution. If a country is binding itself to adopting specific protections for 
                                                 
126 See Part I.A of this Article. 
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protected groups, how can that same country not be willing to protect that precise 
group? 
A legitimate concern is that allowing the government to use another 
country’s superficial decision to sign on to a treaty undermines legitimate asylum 
seekers’ applications. It is no secret that the “binding” provisions of international 
human rights treaties are rarely that. A rubberstamp adoption of a treaty by a 
country that routinely violates human rights is not evidence that the country takes 
those rights seriously. This is no different from domestic law, however: a country’s 
constitutional and statutory protections are not relevant if it inadequately 
implements that legislation. The North Korean constitution offers wide-ranging 
protections.127 No court would take these alleged protections seriously without 
looking behind the veil of the flowery constitutional language. The same is true for 
treaties. For both international and domestic law, it is always necessary to make 
sure that the adoption of law reflects a true intention to commit to and abide by that 
law.  
Parties can circumvent this concern by looking beyond the gateway 
adoption of the treaty to demonstrations that the adoption represents a deeper 
commitment.128  Treaty committees publish reports on the state of a country’s 
compliance with specific treaties every several years.129 An official report by the 
government states what steps it has taken to comply with the treaty; NGO “shadow 
reports” present the non-profit community’s views on the same.130  These rich 
reports give parties easy access to understanding whether a treaty adoption reflects 
a real commitment towards fulfillment of human rights norms. Asylum seekers can 
point to violations of treaties by their home countries as exposed by these reports. 
Such violations demonstrate that even where the country has ostensibly pledged to 
protect a certain group of people, it has failed to take these obligations seriously. 
This in turn supports applicants’ claims by showing that their home countries are 
aware of the relevant international standards but have still not respected them.  
These same considerations are relevant as evidence for an applicant’s 
membership in a particular social group. This proposal is not a significant departure 
from current practice. Take a Ninth Circuit case that found that membership in a 
                                                 
127 See North Korea Const. §§ 8, 45, 74. 
128 See XXXX (private proceeding), RAD File No TB5-03539 ¶ 16 (Can.) (discussing Lebanon’s 
good faith commitment to CEDAW, demonstrated by granting it eminence to domestic laws). 
129 See Human Rights Bodies, OHCHR (2017), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/HumanRightsBodies.aspx. 
130 See Treaty Bodies, OHCHR (2017), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/IPeoples/IPeoplesFund/Pages/TreatyBodies.aspx (offering 
procedures for shadow and alternative reporting); Shadow Reporting to UN Treaty Bodies, INT’L 
WOMEN’S RTS. ACTION WATCH (2013),  
http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/iwraw/reports.html (“By submitting a shadow report to a UN treaty body 
committee, NGOs can highlight issues not raised by their governments or point out where the 
government may be misleading the committee from the real situation.”).  
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gang could plausibly be the basis of a PSG in some countries but not others.131 In 
deciding that PSG determination was appropriate on a country-by-country basis, 
the court recognized that,  
[Countries] have used different strategies for combating gang violence. . . . These 
different local responses to gangs in nations with distinct histories, populations, and 
government structures, may well result in a different social recognition of social 
groups.132 
This analysis shows how a PSG and social visibility determination is closely tuned 
to the interaction between a country, an alleged PSG, and the country’s people, 
culture, and history.  
Treaties lack the nuance of domestic legislation, as they are meant to be 
applicable internationally. Still, a country’s decisions to adopt and comply with 
treaties can be illuminating when making a PSG determination in the same way its 
domestic legislation is. Consider the case of “SA,” a divorced Bangladeshi woman 
with an illegitimate child. SA sought asylum in the UK as a member of the PSG 
“single women with children born out of wedlock.”133 In deciding whether this was 
a PSG, the court first discussed women in general in Bangladesh. It considered 
gains women had made recently in the country, including the adoption of 
CEDAW.134 Though ultimately decided on other grounds, the court concluded that 
reservations to CEDAW’s requirement of ensuring equal rights between men and 
women, along with other factors, weighed in favor of recognizing SA as belonging 
to a cognizable PSG.135 These reservations to CEDAW specifically allowed for 
discriminatory family law, including in the “realms of marriage, divorce . . . and 
child custody.”136 Bangladesh’s tailored reservations to the CEDAW provisions 
implied a desire to protect legislation that hurt women like SA, demonstrating the 
salience of her PSG.  
B. Current Use of International Human Rights Treaties in Asylum Law 
To demonstrate the practical viability of this proposal, this Section moves 
beyond theory and discusses three comparator countries that presently rely on 
treaties in their asylum analyses. The countries surveyed were Australia, Canada, 
and the United Kingdom (UK). These countries were chosen for several reasons: 
they publish decisions in English; they are politically and socially similar to the US; 
and their asylum laws use identical language to US asylum law.137 In addition, 
                                                 
131 Pirir-Boc v. Holder, 750 F.3d 1077, 1084 (9th Cir. 2014). 
132 Id.  
133 SA v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, CG [2011] UKUT 00254 (IAC) ¶ 42 (UK). 
134 Id. at ¶ 56. 
135 Id. at ¶¶  22, 61, 74. 
136 Id. at ¶ 40.  
137 See Migration Act 1958 (62th) § 5H (Austl.); Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 
2001. c. 27 § § 96, 97(1) (Can.); The Refugee or Person in Need of International Protection 
(Qualification) Regulations 2006, SI 2006/2525 § 2 (UK).   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Professors Stephen Meili and Catherine Dauvergne have analyzed the use of 
treaties in asylum cases in the UK and Canada.138 Though Meili’s and Dauvergne’s 
research does not look at the effects on the enforcement of international law caused 
by this phenomenon, their work helps predict how this proposal may play out on 
the ground.  
Each of these comparator countries had numerous examples of asylum cases 
specifically referencing an asylum seeker’s home country’s decision to adopt or not 
adopt a treaty. No country routinely cites international human rights treaties in 
asylum cases, but the US stands as an outlier by never relying on them. This Section 
first discusses the current use of international human rights treaties in each country. 
It then offers explanations for the disparity in the citation rates. 
i. Precedential Use of International Human Rights Treaties in Comparator 
Countries  
This Section explores how these comparator countries consider 
international human rights treaties in asylum cases. The results are not intended to 
demonstrate statistically significant trends, but, along with Meili’s and 
Dauvergne’s related research, to establish that the comparator countries have found 
treaty evidence helpful in asylum cases. This research relies on publicly available 
asylum decisions 139  from each country: for the US, the BIA issues appellate 
decisions; the Refugee Review Tribunal and the Administrative Appeals Tribunal 
in Australia review decisions by the Department of Immigration and 
Citizenship; 140 the Immigration and Refugee Board in Canada provides initial 
decisions on asylum seekers in Canada;141 and the Upper Tribunal (Immigration 
and Asylum) is the appellate level of the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and 
                                                 
138 See generally Stephen Meili, Do Human Rights Treaties Help Asylum-Seekers?: Lessons from 
the United Kingdom, 48 Vand. J. TRANSNATIONAL L. 123 (2015); Stephen Meili, When Do 
Human Rights Treaties Help Asylum Seekers? A Study of Theory and Practice in Canadian 
Jurisprudence Since 1990, 51 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 627 (2014); Catherine Dauvergne, 
International Human Rights in Canadian Immigration Law—The Case of the Immigration and 
Refugee Board of Canada, 19 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 305 (2012). See also Stephen Meili, 
U.K. Refugee Lawyers: Pushing the Boundaries of Domestic Court Acceptance of International 
Human Rights Law, 54 BOS. C. L. REV. 1123 (2013) (explaining how treaties have interacted with 
the UK domestic legal system over the past few decades).  
139 See Dauvergne, supra note 138, at 313. Many asylum cases are not made public. In Canada, 
e.g., Dauvergne estimates that the Immigration and Refugee Board decided over half a million 
cases but only published about ten thousand between 2002 and 2010. 
140 See What Happens at the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT)?, REFUGEE ADVICE & CASEWORK 
SERV. (2012), http://www.racs.org.au/wp-
content/uploads/FS4_What_happens_at_an_RRT_hearing__print.pdf. (On July 1, 2015, the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal, which now considers asylum appeals, absorbed the Refugee 
Review Tribunal. Refugee decisions from the Administrative Appeals Tribunal since July 1, 
2015, were included in this survey).  
141 See Immigration and Refugee Board: About the Board, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE BOARD 
(2016),  
http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/Eng/BoaCom/Pages/index.aspx. 
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Asylum Chamber) in the UK.142 The Article relies on appellate level decisions 
where initial decisions were not available. A “citation” means that a case came up 
on a search in these databases for the full name of the treaty.143 
For comparison’s sake, the chart below includes the number of asylum 
applications received by each country in 2015.144 The total applicant numbers most 
helpfully establish the relative number of applicants between countries. 
Comparisons between total applicants and citations reveal little, since many 
applicants do not complete their asylum process, do not argue before a court, or do 
not appeal.145 In Canada, for example, cases have to have a written opinion only if 
asylum is denied, meaning publicly available decisions are both a subset of written 
decisions and a skewed subset of all cases.146 Meili provides some context about 
the reliance on treaties in asylum cases for one comparator country: just over eleven 
percent of Canadian asylum cases since 1990 have referenced treaties.147 
The following chart shows the frequency of explicit citations to specific 
international human rights treaties in publicly available asylum cases between 
January 1, 2010, and May 13, 2017: 
 
                                                 
142 See Appeal a decision by the immigration and asylum tribunal, UK GOV’T (2017), 
https://www.gov.uk/upper-tribunal-immigration-asylum/overview. 
143 The survey used the following databased: WESTLAW, http://next.westlaw.com; 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL OF AUSTRALIA, 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/AATA/; IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE BOARD OF 
CANADA, https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/irb/; and UN REFUGEE AGENCY, 
http://www.refworld.org/publisher/GBR_UTIAC.html (UK).  
144 See Applications for Asylum Received in 2015, UNHCR (2015),  
 http://www.unhcr.org/576408cd7. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees reports these 
numbers. 
145 See Georgina Sturge et al., ASYLUM STATISTICS 9 (2017), House of Commons Library 
SN01403. More precise denominators (such as the number of appeals to the specific tribunals) 
were not available.  
146 See Dauvergne, supra note 138, at 314. 
147 Meili, Study in Canadian Jurisprudence, supra note 138, at 647, 651 (noting these citation 
rates peaked in the early 2000s and have since declined, potentially due to a “learning effect” 
whereby judges internalize human rights standards and do not need to explicitly cite them).  
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Citations to International Human Rights Treaties (2010 to 2017) 
 United States Australia Canada United Kingdom 
Total Applicants (2015) 135,964 16,117 19,511 53,345 
ICERD 0 2 3 1 
ICCPR 0 126 22 14 
ICESCR 0 5 5 5 
CEDAW 0 17 22 8 
CAT 39  19 13 3 
CRC 1 52 60 21 
ICMW 0 0 0 0 
CPED 0 0 0 1 
CRPD 0 7 3 2 
 
This chart demonstrates that all of the comparator countries cite the surveyed 
treaties occasionally, with citations varying from treaty to treaty148 and country to 
country. The US did not.149 A few caveats: For one, the chart understates the 
reliance on treaties in at least the UK. Meili found that 85 percent of treaty citations 
in asylum cases between 1991 and 2012 were to the European Convention of 
Human Rights (ECHR).150 This Article excluded the ECHR because it is a regional 
treaty, but it enshrines rights similar to those of other human rights treaties.151 
Furthermore, parties in US cases have occasionally tried to bring treaties into their 
arguments. For example, in their appeal, applicants in a Fifth Circuit case invoked 
Russia’s decision not to ratify the CRPD as evidence in favor of a Russian with 
mental disabilities.152  In denying the application for asylum, the court did not 
mention the treaty.153 Other than the UNCAT citations, no US court explicitly cited 
to one of the international human rights treaties except for one BIA decision that 
mentioned but did not rely on the CRC.154  
                                                 
148 See Meili, Lessons from the United Kingdom, supra note 138, at 176. The lack of citations to 
the ICMW and CPED are not surprising, given the distance between their substance and asylum 
law. Meili did not even include these treaties in his research. 
149 US courts cite to the UNCAT because the mechanism for receiving asylum is different when 
an applicant invokes the treaty, for which the US has set up a parallel route to asylum, as 
explained in Part II.B.i of this Article. See, e.g., In re Miguel Anibal Rosales-Rivera, 2016 WL 
8468278, at *1 (BIA Dec. 8, 2016). 
150 See Meili, Lessons from the United Kingdom, supra note 138, at 151.  
151 See European Convention of Human Rights, Rome, 4.XI (1950). 
152 See Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Petitioners and Urging Reversal, Korneenkov v 
Mukasey, No. 07-60712, 2008 WL 7404474, at *17 (5th Cir. Feb. 20, 2008). 
153 See generally, Korneenkov v. Holder, 347 F. Appx. 93, 96 (5th Cir. 2009). 
154 See In re Luis Rodolfo Ramos-Mariscal, WL 5865139, at *1 (BIA Nov. 4, 2011) (“On appeal, 
the respondent renews his argument that he is eligible for unspecified relief from removal . . . 
based on customary international law as reflected in the Convention on the Rights of the Child.”). 
There were a handful of similarly cursory citations to some of the treaties from prior to 2010. See, 
e.g. , In re Ramon Garza-Arevalo,  2006 WL 1558844, at *2 (BIA Apr. 18, 2006).  
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Looking closer at the reasons for which treaties were cited in comparator 
countries, many considered claims by applicants that a country not signing a treaty 
evidenced persecution. A case from the UK considered whether three Zimbabwean 
nationals had a well-founded fear of persecution due to, among other factors, their 
disability (all were HIV-positive). 155  The applicants relied on the fact that 
“Zimbabwe has neither signed nor ratified the [Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities].”156 The court considered this as relevant evidence, though it 
ultimately determined that the situation in Zimbabwe did not give rise to a “legal 
obligation” for the UK.157  
Asylum courts also weighed in favor of the government evidence that the 
applicant’s home country had adopted, and complied with, human rights treaties. 
Considering an application for asylum by an applicant with mental illness, an 
Australian court emphasized that “[s]ources indicate that the situation for persons 
with mental illness in Ghana is improving. . . . In July 2012 Ghana [ ] ratified the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.”158  In a Canadian case 
brought by a female applicant from Lebanon, the court found an insufficient amount 
of evidence to rise to the level of persecution, in part because Lebanon not only 
ratified CEDAW but “published CEDAW in the official Gazette, giving it primacy 
over national laws.”159 A UK decision dismissed the argument that China did not 
persecute an applicant based on religion due to its adoption of the ICCPR, since 
“China’s existing laws did not fully ratify or apply the Convention’s legal 
framework, particularly freedom of religion or belief.”160  
Courts also considered whether countries made reservations to treaties. The 
UK case concerning SA, the divorced Bangladeshi woman with an illegitimate 
child, took this approach.161  When considering “the attitude of police towards 
allegations of [domestic] violence”—relevant to whether the country’s officials 
were willing to prevent persecution of the applicant—the court concluded that, “the 
Bangladeshi state had acceded to [CEDAW] in 1984 and ratified the optional 
protocol on the Convention in 2000” but that “reservations against specific 
CEDAW articles allowed discriminatory ‘personal laws’ . . . to persist.”162  The 
                                                 
155 See RS, EC and BR v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, CG [2010] UKUT 363 (IAC) ¶ 285 
(UK).  
156 Id.  
157 Id. at ¶ 286.  
158 Case No. 1219395 [2013] RRTA 633 (June 26, 2013) ¶ 27. See also Case No. 1005852 [2010] 
RRTA 921 (Oct. 22, 2010) ¶¶ 67, 75 (Austl.) (invoking the ratification of CEDAW and domestic 
legislation, “the Tribunal is satisfied on the country information that state protection is available 
to women and children.”). 
159 XXXX (private proceeding), supra note 128, at ¶ 16.  
160 QH v Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, CG [2014] UKUT 0086 (IAC) ¶ 10 (UK).  
161 See SA, supra note 133, at ¶ 40.  
162 See id.  
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court ultimately allowed the applicant to stay in the country, under the “human 
rights grounds” of the ECHR.163  
Many citations in these cases show courts looking for guidance from the 
treaties about how to define or understand the responsibilities of signatories.164 
These citations do not specifically establish a precedent for this Article’s proposal. 
They are relevant, though, as they demonstrate a willingness by the comparator 
countries to rely on international human rights treaties. These cases show that each 
of these comparator countries have found countries’ ratification of international 
human rights treaties to be helpful in determining asylum cases. The US stands as 
an outlier.  
 
ii. Explaining the Variation in Citation Rates in Comparator Countries 
This Section explores why these disparate citation rates may exist. Negative 
US feelings, ranging from ambivalence to antipathy, toward international law likely 
drives much of the difference between the US and the other countries. This 
correlates with the other likely reason for the lower level of treaty citations in US 
asylum cases: the US itself is not a party to these treaties. The country has not 
ratified six of the nine core human rights treaties, including the CRC and 
CEDAW.165 This does not prevent the US from referencing treaties as evidence: 
one country’s decision to not ratify one does not change another’s obligations under 
it.166 Still, a US court may find it counterintuitive to cite to a treaty that the US has 
not itself adopted. Supporting this conclusion, countries like the UK and Canada 
saw an uptick in treaty citations in asylum cases after formally incorporating 
specific treaties into their domestic law.167 A treaty might have less legitimacy to a 
judge if the US has not given it a seal of approval. The judge also may be afraid of 
casting aspersions onto the US, by holding that not ratifying the same treaty the US 
has not ratified proves a country’s persecution. Part II.B.ii discussed 
counterarguments to these fears; Part III.C.i discusses how this proposal minimizes 
these concerns. 
The reasons for differences in citation rates between and within the 
comparator countries are harder to precisely identify. These differences are likely, 
in part, just noise: the raw number of citations are relatively low, so apparent 
differences likely partially driven by random variance. Citations also vary based on 
                                                 
163 See id. at ¶ 130. 
164 See, e.g., Case No 1218534 [2013] RRTA 717 (Oct. 31, 2013) ¶ 46 (Austl.).  
165 See United States of America – Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard , OHCHR (2014), 
http://indicators.ohchr.org/. 
166 See Vienna Convention, supra note 18, at § 60(5).  
167 See Meili, Lessons from the United Kingdom, supra note 138, at 134; Meili, Study in 
Canadian Jurisprudence, supra note 138, at 659.  
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which treaties each country has incorporated into its law.168 Different people also 
seek asylum from different countries. Since countries persecute their citizens in 
different ways, different treaties will therefore apply to these cases.  
Variance in citation rates between treaties within countries likely 
demonstrates that some treaties are more relevant to and persuasive in asylum cases 
than others. Take the ICESCR and CRC. Few applicants rely on ICESCR. The 
treaty concerns ambitious rights that are not even accepted as “rights” by many 
countries. 169  In rejecting the treaty, President Ronald Reagan’s administration 
criticized the inclusion of economic and social rights as blurring “the vital core of 
human rights.”170 Even among those countries that have accepted the treaty, few 
have obtained meaningful compliance. This fact is recognized by the treaty’s 
“progressive realization” principle, under which countries only need to be moving 
towards realization of the treaty.171 It would be hard for asylum seekers to claim 
persecution based on the controversial and difficult-to-fulfill ICESCR rights. On 
the other hand, courts cite the CRC much more frequently. The treaty supports 
rights for children that are much less controversial, making claims of persecution 
by applicants more feasible.  
C. How This Proposal Works on the Ground  
Drawing inspiration from the application of treaty reliance observed in 
asylum law in other countries, this Section outlines how the Article proposes 
integrating treaties into asylum law and applies the proposal to recent trends in US 
asylum cases.  
i. Technical Application of Proposal 
At base, treaty adoption should be relied on in country condition reports, 
incorporated into arguments by both parties, and then weighed on a case-by-case 
basis by asylum officers and judges. This will affect both stages of the asylum 
process: the initial non-adversarial review by the asylum officer and the adversarial 
proceedings before an immigration judge, as well as subsequent appeals. 
 a) All parties should be directed to rely on international human rights law. 
Meili’s and Dauvergne’s research, as well as the survey provided in this Article, 
shows that the comparator countries all cite treaties in a minority of asylum cases. 
This is not surprising; the citations in these countries are ad hoc. For this Article’s 
proposal to affect countries’ incentives to follow international law as imagined in 
Part II, asylum decisions must rely on this evidence more consistently. To that end, 
the asylum process should require that applicants report on their I-589 application 
                                                 
168 See Meili, Lessons from the United Kingdom, supra note 138, at 134; Meili, Study in 
Canadian Jurisprudence, supra note 138, at 659. 
169 See ICESCR, supra note 11, at §§ 7, 12, 13.  
170 Alston, supra note 30, at 122. 
171 See ICESCR, supra note 11, at § 2. 
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for asylum172 and country condition reports the status of treaty adoption for relevant 
treaties.173 Government attorneys should likewise include the relevant evidence in 
their reports. Asylum officers and immigration judges should rely on the same 
(even if just to say that the international law is inapposite). All parties should also 
be directed to ask questions about the relevance of treaty adoption during the 
asylum hearing. 
This proposal should not prove overly burdensome on any party. Asylum 
hearings take several hours; the addition of several questions regarding treaty 
compliance will not make them significantly longer. Evidence from other countries 
also suggests that judges demonstrated a “learning effect” as they familiarized 
themselves with these rights.174 Although this proposal might be difficult to initially 
implement, the small body of relevant treaties means it should not create a long-
term increase in time spent on asylum cases as all parties become familiar with the 
international law landscape.  
 Beyond increasing the visibility of international human rights law within 
domestic US asylum law, this directive will also avoid a pitfall noted in the UK and 
Canadian case studies. In each, advocates faced judges skeptical of—or blatantly 
hostile towards—international law.175 Judges sometimes indicated they believed 
the advocates cited to international law as a last-ditch resort for a “weak case.”176 
Making citations mandatory would remove the potential adverse consequences of 
such citations. This advice also builds off of Meili’s research, which suggests that 
courts more often rely on international law where the domestic law has officially 
incorporated it.177 To be sure, the US is unlikely to take the path of the UK and 
officially incorporate international human rights treaties into its legal system. 
Officially requiring these references in cases attempts to more modestly address 
Meili’s findings by increasing the status of treaties as officially required evidence.   
b) Different pieces of evidence should be weighed differently, on a case-by-
case basis. This Article has discussed several relevant aspects of international 
human rights treaties. Some of these are easier for busy attorneys to analyze and 
overworked immigration judges to consider, such as the black-and-white facts of 
whether a country has adopted a treaty. The more probative evidence requires more 
effort: the significance of the reservations made, the reasons why a country did not 
adopt a treaty, the nuances of treaty compliance. In addition, treaties will have 
varying levels of relevance across cases. ICERD intuitively relates to asylum 
applicants claiming persecution based on race. For a disabled, female, minority 
                                                 
172 See I-589, supra note 105. 
173 This directive may be relaxed for pro se asylum seekers, who have less capacity to undertake 
this research.  
174 See Dauvergne, supra note 138, at 323. 
175 See Meili, Study in Canadian Jurisprudence, supra note 138, at 651; Meili, Lessons from the 
United Kingdom, supra note 138, at 162–63. 
176 See Meili, Lessons from the United Kingdom, supra note 138, at 173; Meili, Study in 
Canadian Jurisprudence, supra note 138, at 655–56. 
177 See Meili, Lessons from the United Kingdom, supra note 138, at 174. 
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applicant claiming asylum based on a PSG, it takes more effort to understand how 
the CRPD, CEDAW, and ICERD interact. 
It would help the simplicity of this proposal if the Article offered 
suggestions on precisely how a court should weigh of these pieces of evidence. That 
is, unfortunately, not possible. Each data point interacts differently with different 
cases and in different contexts.178 Still, some general guidance applies.  
For one, adoption of a relevant treaty should create a presumption that the 
country respects the rights enshrined therein. Affirmative evidence that a country 
respects a right works against a finding of persecution, but a country can—of 
course—both respect a right and violate it. An applicant can rebut this presumption 
by showing that the adoption of a treaty constitutes merely low-cost posturing, 
rather than substantive commitment to the relevant rights.  
Relatedly, non-adoption of a treaty ought to be more probative evidence 
than adoption. This Article has acknowledged how even antisocial regimes like 
North Korea opt into some treaties, how Saudi Arabia is a signatory to CEDAW 
despite its abysmal record on women’s rights. Where treaty adoption appears at 
times the default option, the route that allows a country to slip under the radar, non-
adoption shows a more deliberate refusal to recognize certain norms. Of course 
non-adoption of a specific treaty must be considered in its context: countries like 
the US broadly do not adopt treaties for reasons that speak little to its respect of the 
rights contained within the treaty.  
Finally, the evidence that comes after the adoption of a treaty will often 
prove more probative than the initial adoption. The reports by the treaty 
committees, the signatory country, and the NGOs concerning treaty compliance all 
contain especially probative evidence, as these are investigative reports with 
country-specific conclusions. Reservations, as seen in the case of SA, the divorced 
Bangledeshi asylum seeker, and optional protocols both demonstrate a country 
tailoring a boilerplate treaty to its domestic context. Of course, weighing 
reservations more heavily than treaty adoption does have the potential for adverse 
consequences: a country might just opt out of the treaty entirely. This possibility 
should not outweigh the probative nature of the reservations. It in fact reflects an 
ongoing discussion about the wisdom of treaty reservations, and whether they allow 
countries to have their cake and eat it, too (by both signaling adoption of popular 
rights and eschewing real obligations).179  
ii. Applying Potential Treaty Uses to US Asylum Trends 
This Section makes this proposal concrete by applying the proposal to 
asylum trends in the US. There are six countries that this Section considers: the top 
                                                 
178 These case-by-case variations militated against a more extreme proposal, such as using treaty 
adoption to shift the burden of proof in asylum cases.  
179 See generally Daniel W. Hill, Jr., Avoiding Obligation: Reservations to Human Rights 
Treaties, 60 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1129 (2016).  
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countries, based on 2015 numbers, in terms of refugee arrivals in the US180 and 
granted applications for asylum.181 In 2015, 69,933 refugees arrived in the US. The 
top three countries for refugee arrival were Myanmar (Burma) (18,386), Iraq 
(12,676), and Somalia (8,858). From 135,964 total asylum seekers, of those 
applicants whose asylum was granted, the plurality was from a different slate of 
countries: China (6,192), El Salvador (2,173), and Guatemala (2,082).182  
The next inquiry is the countries’ adoption status of the relevant 
international human rights treaties. These six countries have adopted the major 
human rights treaties listed as shown in the chart below.183 Green signifies that a 
treaty has been adopted; yellow, that it has been signed or ratified but with 
reservations; and red, that it has not been adopted (neither signed nor ratified).   
The Adoption Status of International Human Rights Treaties by Asylum Seekers’ Home Countries 
  Myanmar Iraq Somalia China 
El 
Salvador 
Guatemala 
ICERD             
ICCPR             
ICESCR             
CEDAW             
CAT             
CRC             
ICMW             
CPED             
CRPD             
 
This chart suggests several potential routes that hypothetical asylum parties 
could take to strengthen their arguments using international human rights treaties. 
Take the countries that have adopted treaties subject to reservations. Iraq adopted 
CEDAW, the treaty protecting women from discrimination, subject to extensive 
reservations, including to Article 2(f) and (g).184 These sections pledge a country to 
“take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing 
                                                 
180 These are individuals who received refugee status abroad. See note 81 for the difference 
between an asylum seeker and a refugee. This Section includes refugees to add diversity to the 
countries considered. 
181 The breakdown of total asylum seekers by country (regardless of ultimate success) was not 
available. 
182 See Refugees and Asylees, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (2016), 
https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/refugees-asylees.  
183 See Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard, OHCHR (2014),  
http://indicators.ohchr.org/. 
184 See Iraq – Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard, OHCHR (2014),  
http://indicators.ohchr.org/. 
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laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination against 
women” and to “repeal all national penal provisions which constitute 
discrimination against women.”185  Reservations to these substantive provisions 
could be compelling evidence for an Iraqi asylum seeker claiming that her home 
government is unwilling to prevent persecution on the basis of a PSG that is related 
to her sex. Iraq has specifically opted out of amending its laws to eliminate gender 
discrimination; the country has not shown itself as willing to prevent 
discrimination.186 
Courts can also look to overall trends in adopting treaties. Consider a 
Guatemalan applicant with disabilities claiming persecution on the basis of a PSG 
grounded in that disability status. The government party might point to Guatemala’s 
consistent history of fully adopting human rights treaties. It could cite the UN’s 
most recent report on Guatemala’s compliance with the CRPD, where it 
“congratulate[d]” the state on its efforts to comply with the CRPD,” including 
adopting domestic laws and programs.187 In response, the applicant could point to 
the Commission’s acknowledgement of ongoing discrimination and poor 
implementation of domestic laws. 188  The applicant could cite to related NGO 
shadow reports to demonstrate the flaws with implementation of the CRPD as 
observed by civil society.189 Bringing in these reports and discussions over the 
import of Guatemala’s adoption of the CRPD would add additional nuance to this 
asylum case.  
In contrast with Guatemala, Somalia and Myanmar both stand out as 
countries that have refrained from adopting many important human rights treaties. 
This trend could also be relevant in asylum cases: a male Myanmar migrant worker 
basing his application on race could show that Myanmar’s decision not to adopt 
ICERD, coupled with its failure to adopt ICCPR, CAT, ICMW, and CPED shows 
the government is not willing to prevent persecution on the basis of an alleged PSG 
of which he is a member. That the country has signed on to some other human 
rights treaties shows that it cannot justify its decision to not sign these treaties 
merely based on an absolute aversion to involvement in the international system. 
These hypotheticals of course would all hinge on the specifics of an applicant’s 
                                                 
185 CEDAW, supra note 12, at § 2(f)–(g).  
186. See El Salvador – Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard, OHCHR (2014),  
http://indicators.ohchr.org/. Some reservations are less useful. El Salvador adopted the CRPD “to 
the extent that its provisions do not prejudice or violate the provisions of any of the precepts, 
principles and norms enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic of El Salvador.” This generic 
reservation does not necessarily suggest the country is attempting to avert treaty obligations. 
187 CRPD, supra note 17, at § II.6.  
188 Id. at § III.13. 
189 See generally, e.g., Disability Rights in Guatemala, SIDA (Nov. 2014), 
http://www.sida.se/globalassets/sida/eng/partners/human-rights-based-approach/disability/rights-
of-persons-with-disabilities-guatemala.pdf. See also note Error! Bookmark not defined. and 
accompanying text. 
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situation, but these examples demonstrate a few manifestations of how treaties 
could be drawn into common US asylum cases. 
*** 
This proposal originates in the natural connection between international and 
asylum law. Courts already look at the general situation of the home country when 
determining persecution. For each case, the parties submit country condition reports 
that present an overview of the relevant aspects of a country. A country’s adoption 
of, reservations to, and compliance with international human rights treaties provide 
additional nuance to this analysis.  
The examples in this Section bring the Article back to its driving 
motivation: adoption of the proposal will pressure countries to comply with 
international human rights law. The hypothetical parties just discussed each play a 
small part in encouraging compliance with international law. The mere references 
to treaties increases the visibility of international law and norm internalization. 
Furthermore, Iraq may have seen CEDAW reservations as costless decisions that 
let it appear to respect women’s rights without adapting its behavior. Using that 
reservation to demonstrate persecution adds cost to those decisions. The same is 
true for Guatemala: its adoption of treaties will be outweighed by evidence that it 
does not respect its substantive obligations under the treaties. Myanmar has not 
even taken the gateway step of signing many treaties. As a democratizing country 
trying to integrate into the international community,190 asylum cases that explicitly 
cite to its failure to adopt these treaties will be an impetus for it to adopt them. 
These effects may be marginal, but they tip the scale a bit more towards 
incentivizing compliance with international human rights laws.   
D. Responses to Potential Counterarguments and Repercussions 
 This Section addresses several additional concerns that may arise from this 
proposal. One might claim that this proposal does not improve asylum cases enough 
for the change to be worthwhile. Critics could also argue that this proposal will be 
more difficult to implement than this Article suggests. Moreover, if the proposal is 
implemented, people might fear its repercussions: some countries may actually 
want other countries to accept their citizens as refugees, and this proposal will 
dissuade countries from taking international obligations seriously. A final concern 
is that using treaties in this way will allow receiving countries like the US to more 
easily reject refugees.  
Meili’s research contradicts the first concern: he found that treaty citations 
in the UK and Canada were helpful in about a third to half of cases in which they 
were cited.191 Other reports and assessments included in the country condition 
                                                 
190 See Myanmar wants foreign investment to create jobs, BBC (Nov. 21, 2016), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/av/business-30139678/myanmar-investment-will-create-jobs. 
191 See Meili, Lessons from the United Kingdom, supra note 138, at 158–59; Meili, Study in 
Canadian Jurisprudence, supra note 138, at 657. “Helpful” citations mean the treaty was the 
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reports (such as reports by Human Rights Watch and the State Department) also 
rarely turn the decision in asylum cases. But they provide some on-point, relevant, 
unique information, and parties thus still include them in country reports. The 
parties ought to consider a country’s approach to international law for the same 
reasons. For example, in an asylum case where Australia considered the state of 
persons with mental illness in Ghana, the deciding court had little access to reliable 
information on the topic. The court’s decision to consider Ghana’s recent adoption 
of a relevant international human rights treaty was valuable in assessing whether 
the country was serious about protecting these asylum seekers.192  
As mentioned in Part II.B, immigration judges are infamous for being, at 
best, overworked. This may mean that this proposal, if implemented, will be 
implemented poorly. Evidence from the UK minimizes this concern. Immigration 
judges hearing these cases were “professional” in their analysis of human rights-
based claims, especially as these citations became more frequent. 193 To be sure, if 
a judge is already going to give little serious consideration to an applicant’s 
argument then that judge will not overcome that approach because of a country’s 
compliance with CEDAW. Just because the system is imperfect does not mean that 
there are not judges who carefully ponder the entirety of an application. This 
proposal does not require much of a shift in immigration court proceedings, either 
in terms of time or content. It does require a new type of intellectual engagement 
with the facts, but just because some judges may be unwilling to truly engage in 
this exercise should not stymy the proposal.    
 Next, this proposal should not inadvertently dissuade countries from 
adopting human rights treaties. There may indeed be refugees that home countries 
are happy for other countries to accept, but the types of applicants that this proposal 
implicates are not the same type as those fleeing the ongoing conflict in Syria, for 
instance. Many of those individuals, fleeing death, violence, and a dearth of 
opportunities, are not actually “refugees” as contemplated under the Refugee 
Convention. They have not faced specific persecution; they have faced war. 
Countries accepting these refugees do so under different, often ad hoc 
agreements.194 Grants of the types of asylum status contemplated in this proposal 
cast judgment on the asylum seeker’s government’s actions, and as discussed in 
Part II.B.iii, countries appear to avoid such grants. In the rare instances where the 
country does want another nation to accept its nationals as refugees, norm 
internalization and reputational shaming will pressure countries against rejecting 
treaties solely for the purpose of generating refugees. 
                                                 
basis for the court’s grant of asylum; that it supported another argument; or that it was cited in 
explaining the applicants’ home country’s conditions. 
192 See Case No. 1219395, supra note 158, at ¶ 27. 
193 See Meili, Lessons from the United Kingdom, supra note 138, at 169. 
194 See Implementing the EU-Turkey Statement – Questions and Answers, EU COMM’N (June 15, 
2016), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-1664_en.htm. Countries in Europe, e.g., 
have adopted particular protocols about accepting refugees fleeing from Syria. 
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 A final concern—that this proposal may in fact make it easier for receiving 
countries to reject potential applicants applying for asylum—is more complex. This 
concern gets to a baseline normative assumption: that it is better for countries to 
accept more asylum seekers. At base, this proposal is orthogonal to this issue, as it 
concerns helping countries accept the correct applicants, without reference to the 
number of applicants to accept. To the extent anti-asylum proponents might use the 
proposal as a weapon against applicants, empirical evidence from Canada suggests 
they would fail. Cases referencing international law more frequently led to the 
approval of asylum, even with judges demonstrating skepticism towards 
international law.195 And, of course, this proposal does not intend to revolutionize 
domestic or international law, and, on a micro level, should not revolutionize 
individual cases. This does not mean that citing to treaties is negligible, or just extra 
pages to throw into a long report. As has been argued throughout this Article, the 
effects on specific cases may be marginal but the broader implications significant.   
For these reasons, the potential negative side effects of the use of treaties in 
asylum law appear minimal, and this proposal ought not scare parties because it 
brings new facts to light in any given case. Facts about treaty adoption and 
compliance add new angles to asylum cases, and added nuance to any legal case 
should be embraced, rather than spurned.  
Conclusion 
For the reasons offered above, we should integrate treaties into domestic 
US asylum law in the manner proposed in this Article. The use of treaties in this 
way, for which there is a precedent in comparator countries’ asylum law, will create 
a new enforcement mechanism for international human rights law. Reliance on 
international human rights treaties in domestic asylum law will capitalize on both 
proven informal enforcement mechanisms and aspects unique to asylum law to add 
a new weight to the scale when countries are facing the choice of whether to violate 
international human rights law, making them just a bit more likely to choose 
compliance.  
                                                 
195 See Dauvergne, supra note 138, at 318.  
